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 Is There Room for
 Human Factor Engineering
 In Design?
 By
 Kenneth E. Arnold
 Paragon Engineering Companies
 April, 2002 
What Does HFE Address?
• Trip, slips and falls
– Reduce Injuries
• Simplifying Maintenance and Operations Tasks
– Reduce Downtime
– Reduce Injuries
– Reduce Fatalities (Low to Medium 
Number/Occurrence)
• Reacting to Abnormal Situations
– Reduce Loss of Installation
– Reduce Injuries
– Reduce Fatalities (Medium to High 
Number/Occurrence)
Trips, Slips and Falls
– Easiest Place to Concentrate (New Design)
– Well Covered in Literature
– Standards - Ladders, handrails, stairways, walkways,            
etc.
– Implement by Training and Auditing
– Still Major Problem On Existing Facilities In GoM &  
North Sea
Simplifying Maintenance and Operations Tasks
• Medium difficulty to implement
• Access, Access, Access!
• Lifting, Lifting, Lifting!
• Task analysis with help from O&M Staff - Rethink 
design
• No longer a matter of simply applying standard.  
Have to think through and visualize the O&M 
process.
Reacting to Abnormal Situations
• The real prize! The most difficult to obtain!
• Major accidents are almost always caused by a 
series of escalating events.
• At any point human interaction can accelerate or 
decelerate the magnitude of consequences.
• How do we design so that the natural reaction is 
to take action which midigates the 
consequences?
Human Factors
• “80% of all accidents are caused by human error”  
(Bob Bea)
• Amato corollary “and 80% of these are caused by 
failure of management systems”
• Arnold corollary “yes, but 80% of all accidents 
are also caused by design which does not 
encourage the correct human response”
• Examples
– Three Mile Island ($4B)
– Ocean Ranger (84 Fatalities)
– Piper Alpha (167 Fatalities)
Three Mile Island (1979)
• Popular conception - Operator training
• What happened
– Steam System Went Down
– PV Valve on Pressurizer tank opened
– As Pressure Decreased Control Room Light Went Out Indicating  
Signal to Open PV Valve No Longer Existed
– Pressure Relief Valve Stuck Open, Staff thought it had closed
– Pressure Decreased Further in Pressurizer Tank.  Water Level   
Rose
– To keep from packing the pressurizer tank leading to an 
immediate overpressure.  Operators dumped water.
– 110 alarm lights flashing
– Fixed on lowering water level in pressurizer tank
Three Mile Island (1979) - Continued
• Given low pressure in pressurizer tank but high level, multiple 
alarm sirens and no direct indication of leak, operators fixed on 
controlling level.  Ignored other indicators of loss of water in
cooling system:  temperature rise in containment building, 
vibration of circulating pumps (cavitation)
• Design problems
– No water level indicator in reactor
– Temperature of PV drain limited by computer to 280°F max 
output even though actually 600°F
– No direct readout that PV was actually closed
– Too many alarms
Ocean Ranger (1982)
• Popular Conception - Operator Training
• What happened -
– Storm wave breaks port light window shorting ballast control panel
– Sea valves started opening and closing randomly
– Shut-Off Power - Valves close
– Decided to turn on power to deballast to higher level
– Started settling by bow
– Screwed in brass by-pass rods to cause valves to close
– By-pass rods actually caused valves to fail open
– Could not launch survival craft in storm with list
Ocean Ranger (1982) - Continued
• Design problems
– Easy to short out panel in ballast control room
– No way to isolate panel and still activate pumps or check 
status
– Brass by-pass rods opened sea valves
– No way to launch survival craft with rig tilted down by the bow
Piper Alpha (1988)
• Popular Conception - Failure of Permit to Work System, Operator 
Training
• What happened -
– Day crew isolated pump for maintenance
– Day crew removed PSV on condensate pump for annual safety check
– Did not properly install gasket, blind flange and bolts
– Night crew unaware and put pump in service
• Design Problem
– Decoupled PSV from Pump It Protected
– Gas Heard Escaping In Compressor Room But Source 
Unknown 
Why Did Paragon Form HFE Group
• Improve designs by better safety, operability and maintainability
• The client deserves the option.  (Problem: Will he pay?)
• Implementation
– Upper Management Support
– Acquire/Develop Expertise
– Develop Specifications and Standards
– Develop Implementation Plan
– Train Engineers and Designers
– Convince Project Managers to Include HFE as Integral Part of Team
– Convince Clients of Value
• Need for HFE Professionals
– Educational Background
– A thought process and not just “common sense”
– Compromises will be made 
Paragon Success Stories
 British Petroleum Mardi Gras Pipeline
• HFE has been integrated into project from inception
• Reduced time for redesign by implementing HFE standards and comments into 
initial design
• Improved safety for maintenance, materials handling and pigging operations by 
incorporating HFE principles
• As a result of this work we are providing HF training and support to project 
members of the other projects that form part of BP GoM Deepwater 
Development Program
 FPSO Project 
• HFE involvement in evaluation and design of LQ save $5 -10 million by reducing 
square footage requirement
Paragon Success Stories (Continued)
 Shell Offshore Inc URSA Platform
• Implementation of redesigned control room has improved worker satisfaction
• Operability and maintainability of the control room equipment has been 
improved through well thought out design
• Environmental characteristics have been improved through application of proper 
lighting, noise and ventilation control
• As a result of this work we were also asked to conduct a HF review of Auger 
control room
 Survival Capsule Study
• Research showed that capsules could not accommodate the rated number of 
persons due to difference in physical size between the “average” offshore 
worker and population anthropometrics used in the design and rating of the 
capsules
• MMS has issued a safety alert as a result of this work
• A number of GoM operators have de-rated the capacity of some survival 
capsules at their facilities due to this research
Where Are We In Design Safety
• We are today where we were with regard to Hazard Analysis in 1980”s
– “Common Sense”
– “ We do it already”
– “ Why do we need a separate hazard analysis?”
– “It is only good engineering practice”
• The truth is we needed the discipline of Hazards Analysis to force us to make sure we 
implement what we knew.
• The one way to make a step change in safety after implementing SEMP is through 
HFE.  We need the discipline of HFE professionals and an implementation plan.
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